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Communism and Economic Modernization
In the 1950s, one third of the world’s population lived under communism.In World War II the Red Army of the Soviet Union, the first communiststate, had destroyed the armies of Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria andthe Kwantung army of Japan. In the wake of the Soviet Army, Communiststook power in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,Poland, and Romania. Communist resistance movements took power inYugoslavia, North Vietnam, North Korea, and China. Other countries withexperience of communist rule include Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia.Wherever they took power, communist leaders adopted neweconomic institutions. There were common themes with some nationalvariations. There was state ownership of the ‘commanding heights’ ofheavy industry and transport, small peasant farms were amalgamatedinto large cooperatives under state supervision (except in Poland), andmany markets were suppressed (but fewer in Yugoslavia). Everywhereeconomic management was politicized so that decisions at every levelwere based on what was supposedly right or wrong for the country ratherthan profit or loss. Because these institutions worked imperfectly, all thecountries under communist rule also made attempts at reform. In theEuropean communist countries all such reforms failed.1 Between 1989and 1991 communist rule ended everywhere except China, Vietnam, Laos,North Korea, and Cuba.These economies were termed ‘socialist’ because the Marxist-Leninistideology of their rulers adopted the goal of communism, a society ofabundance and voluntary sharing, with socialism as the currentdevelopmental phase that would precede its attainment. The challengepresented by communism was military and cultural as well as economic,but both military power and cultural appeals were underpinned byeconomic strength, and the relative merits of socialist economicinstitutions were widely debated. At one time it was commonly thoughtthat communist Russia would overtake America in productivity and
1 Włodzimerz Brus, ‘Institutional change within a planned economy’, in M. C. Kaser, ed., The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975, vol.3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart,
Comparative Economic Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); JánosKornai, The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism (Oxford:Blackwell, 1992).
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consumption per head in the foreseeable future.2 Particular inefficienciesof the socialist economies were obvious, but many believed until the endor beyond it that either more ideology or less ideology could fix thedefects while retaining the core institutions. Regardless of any difficulties,their control of economic resources was enough that communist rulerscould confront the West militarily and diplomatically in Europe, Africa,Asia, and South America.The term ‘modernization’ was not native to the communist lexicon.Nonetheless the ideology of communism provides obvious equivalents tothe objective of modernization in rejecting traditional or pre-moderninstitutions and customs and setting ambitious developmental aims andobjectives for societies under communist rule. In China the objectives ofstrengthening agriculture, industry, science and technology, and nationaldefence, advanced by prime minister Zhou Enlai in 1975 (and after him byDeng Xiaoping), are conventionally translated as the ‘fourmodernizations’; since 1982 ‘socialist modernization’ is the goal thatChina’s constitution has prescribed for its people.3
Aims and objectivesIn 1917 and the years that followed, the Bolsheviks stole power andproperty from Russia’s nobility and new middle class. After a decade ofupheaval and consolidation, civil war and reconstruction, their dreamshad become action plans for the economic and military modernization ofthe Soviet Union. When other countries joined the Soviet Union in acommunist club after World War II, they initially copied these plans,adapting them afterwards to the variety of national circumstances.Judging from their rhetoric, the communists proposed everywhere toreorganize the economy on socially rational or ‘planned’ lines so as tomove society into the era of abundance. In 1959, for example, the Sovietleader Nikita Khrushchev famously promised to achieve this by 1980.4Such goals appeared to be humane, even if the methods used to pursuethem often did not. At the same time it is natural to wonder whether we
2 E.g. Calvin B. Hoover, ‘Soviet economic growth’, Foreign Affairs 35,no. 22 (1957), 257-270; Oleg Hoeffding, ‘Substance and shadow in theSoviet seven year plan’, Foreign Affairs 37, no. 3 (1959), 394-406.
3 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China atnpc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2824.htm.
4 Alex Titov, ‘The 1961 party programme and the fate of Khrushchev’s
reforms’, in Melanie Ilič and Jeremy Smith, eds, Soviet State and Society
under Nikita Khrushchev (London: Routledge, 2009), 8-25.
3
should take such programmatic aspirations at face value and give themcausal significance in explaining what was brought about undercommunism. Politicians generally promise to act on behalf of society byfollowing one or another moral and political code; if we may be scepticalwhen a president claims to be guided by God, why not when a generalsecretary claimed to have followed Marx?Possibly, the overarching aspirations that politicians and businessleaders profess, such as to maximize shareholder value or to improvesocial well being, are too abstract to be informative of their truepreferences. More revealing of what really matters to them may be themeasurable objectives that these leaders set as intermediate goals and thepolicy instruments and resources that they allocate to them.5 On thatbasis, the measurable modernizing objective that was most widely sharedamong communist leaders, having taken power in less developed regions,was ‘to catch up and overtake’ the economically more advanced countriesof the West.6 In October 1917, for example, Lenin wrote:7The revolution has resulted in Russia catching up with the advancedcountries in a few months, as far as her political system is concerned.But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternativewith ruthless severity: either perish or overtake and outstrip theadvanced countries economically as well.Ten years later, at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, Stalinintervened in the struggle between alternative visions of the revolution inRussia and the world to restate the necessity of ‘overtaking andoutstripping the advanced capitalist countries.’8 A few years later, in1931, he reformulated this idea memorably as follows:9
5 E.g. Vladimir Kontorovich , and Alexander Wein, ‘What did the Sovietrulers maximise?’ Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 9 (2009), 1579-1601.
6 R. W. Davies, ‘The “modernization” of the Soviet economy in theinter-war years’, in Markku Kangaspuro and Jeremy Smith, eds,
Modernisation in Russia since 1900 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society,2006), 71-83.
7 V. I. Lenin, ‘The impending catastrophe and how to combat it’, in
Collected Works, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress, 1974), 369.
8 J. V. Stalin, ‘Political report of the central committee’, in Works, vol.10 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), 310.
9 J. V. Stalin, ‘The tasks of business executives,” in Works, vol. 13(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), 40-41.
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One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings shesuffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten bythe Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She wasbeaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish andLithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and Frenchcapitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her - forher backwardness: for military backwardness, for culturalbackwardness, for political backwardness, for industrialbackwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten becauseto do so was profitable and could be done with impunity ...That is why we must no longer lag behind.We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. Wemust make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or theycrush us.The importance of military motives for communist economicmodernization is something that historians have rediscovered. During thepostwar period, economists on both sides of the Cold War tended todefine the Soviet Union as a ‘developmental state’ of the sort that waslater identified with postwar Japan.10 They described a Soviet strategy foreconomic development driven by benevolent goals of civilian welfare,perhaps distorted by an unduly long time horizon and willingness toimpose present sacrifices for the sake of future generations. Militarymotives, other than purely defensive considerations, were rarelyexamined in any depth.11
10 M. H. Dobb, Soviet Economic Development since 1917 (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948); Nicolas Spulber, Soviet Strategy forEconomic Growth, and Foundations of Soviet Strategy for EconomicGrowth: Selected Soviet Essays, 1924-1930 (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1964); Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model andUnderdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1969); Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London: AllenLane, 1969); Holland Hunter and Janusz M. Szyrmer, Faulty Foundations:Soviet economic policies, 1928-1940 (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1992); Robert C. Allen, Farm to Factory: a Reinterpretation of theSoviet Industrial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2003). On Japan see Chalmers A. Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Riseof the Developmental State (New York: Norton, 1995).
11 But exceptionally see E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, Foundations of a
Planned Economy, 1926-1929, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 454-60.
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In contrast, studies of Bolshevik politics and policies in the 1920sbased on the Russian archives have advanced new evidence of the weightof military interests and military security in Stalin’s key decisions toaccelerate industrialization, collectivize peasant farming, and squeezeconsumption for the sake of accumulation and defense.12 Based on relatedarguments about Soviet leaders’ ‘revealed preferences’, VladimirKontorovich and Alexander Wein have argued that the prime objective ofcommunist rule in Russia was military modernization, or to ‘catch up andovertake’ the West militarily.13 In their view, economic modernizationwas just a means to military competition.
BeliefsStalin and other communist leaders shared strong convictions about howthe world worked. They believed that the decisive factor in the world waspower, and that power was ultimately the power to dominate and coerceby superior force rather than the power to persuade or attract bysuperior example or to engage cooperatively. They defined internationalsociety by its distribution of power, and they saw the opportunity forRussia as more to contend for domination than to cooperate throughexchange. They did not rule out trade, but saw it as a channel forredistributing a fixed sum of values between winners and losers, ratherthan a means of augmenting values from which all could gain.
12 N. S. Simonov, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920-1950-e gody: tempy ekonomicheskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiiaproizvodstva i upravlenie (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996); John Barber andMark Harrison, eds, The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin toKhrushchev (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000); Lennart Samuelson, Plans forStalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning,1925-41 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); David R. Stone, Hammer andRifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 (Lawrence:University Press of Kansas, 2000); Olga Velikanova, ‘The Myth of the“Besieged Fortress”: Soviet Mass Perception in the 1920s and 1930s’,Stalin-Era Research and Archives Project Working Paper no. 7 (Universityof Toronto: CREES, 2002); O. N. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie ipoliticheskie resheniia. Konets 1920-seredina 1930-kh gg., 1/e (StPetersburg: Evropeiskii universitet v Sankt-Peterburge, 2002) and 2/e(Moscow: OGI, 2008); and Mark Harrison, ed., Guns and Rubles: theDefense Industry in the Stalinist State (New Haven, 2008). Althoughowing little to the archives, see also James J. Schneider, The Structure ofStrategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), and Kontorovich and Wein, ‘What did theSoviet rulers maximise?’
13 Kontorovich , and Wein, ‘What did the Soviet rulers maximise?’
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Thus, as Lenin had put it, if Russia was not to be dominated, she had todominate others: ‘either perish or overtake.’ To dominate meant to grow,modernize the economy and the armed forces, become economicallymore capable than others, and translate some of the incrementaleconomic capacity into new military power.This view of international society was complemented by a set ofsimplified beliefs about domestic economics and politics. Stalin educatedhimself and others in the doctrine that production, not marketcompetition or exchange, is the engine of growth. More precisely, it wasthe production of things that impressed him, not that of services. When helooked at the standards of modernity set by the economically moreadvanced countries of Western Europe and North America, what attractedhis attention was tons of coal, steel, and cement, numbers of lathes, andmegawatts of electrical power, and he concluded that if only Russia couldproduce as much per head of its population of coal, steel, and othersupplies as Germany or America, then Russia would be as modern and aspowerful as its rivals.Such beliefs underpinned all the industrial policies of Stalin and thecommunists after Stalin. From the 1930s to the 1980s it became almostinfinitely more sophisticated, yet even under Brezhnev and Gorbachevthere remained recognizable traces of Stalin’s view that we are strongerwhen we make more things.There were political and military implications. Stalin, the little Stalinsthat took power in other communist countries, and their successorsbelieved that they could not promote these intermediate goals withoutconfiscating property, centralizing economic resources in the hands of thestate, and directing and controlling the efforts of the population bydecree.They accepted that the mobilization of the economy towards stategoals would inevitably create layers of people who were eitherembittered because they had lost their family property or social status, orunwilling because they placed private aspirations above those of the state.Because such people existed, and because the unwilling would remaineven when the expropriated had died out, the security of the communiststate was always under threat from within as well as from without. ‘Wehave internal enemies. We have external enemies,’ Stalin declared. ‘This,comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.’14
14 Stalin, ‘The work of the April joint plenum of the central committeeand central control commission’, in Works, vol. 11 (Moscow: ForeignLanguages Publishing House: 1949), 67.
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Moreover, all the ruling communist parties had had the experience ofseizing power in their own countries, and knew they had been in aposition to do this only because international conflict had weakened theresistance of the established order to the point where its external andinternal enemies could combine to overthrow it. Were this to happenagain, the communists would be the victims overthrown in their turn.15This knowledge was of extreme concern to them, given their sharedunderstanding of the nature of modern war. Their experience of twoworld wars told them that, in modern warfare, the ability to maintain andsupply massive armies continuously in the field was decisive. Theirexpectations did not change significantly in the atomic era, partly becausethey evolved ways of thinking about how to fight and win even on anuclear battlefield, and partly because the likely suddenness of a nuclearonset shifted the emphasis to permanent war readiness. This, in turn,depended on the ‘stability of the rear,’ a code phrase for a calm andobedient population continuously providing military and food suppliesand logistical services to the armed forces.16In the event of foreign complications, how was it possible to avoid adestabilization of the rear, bringing the strikes and insurrections thatoverthrew the old regimes? Here the communists everywhere foundutility in identifying foreign enemies and encouraging a permanent waratmosphere. In this context they could mobilize the economy and buildthe large armed forces that would enable them to manage tension whileavoiding actual warfare (at least with the principal adversary, which theyidentified as the United States). They could also build a police state, whilestigmatizing opposition and resistance as the influence of foreignsponsors operating under a domestic cover.17At the same time, since no one can rule without friends, thecommunists learned to build and manage the loyalty of the citizens.Socialist cities became hubs of power and privilege as well as ofproduction. In the cities many millions of supporters were trained forpositions of authority or were promoted directly into them. Promotion
15 Harrison, ‘The dictator and defense’, in Mark Harrison, ed., Guns and
Rubles: the Defense Industry in the Stalinist State (New Haven, 2008), 1-30.
16 Schneider, Structure of Strategic Revolution, 232-241.
17 David R. Shearer, Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and SocialOrder in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press,2009); Paul M. Hagenloh, Stalin's Police: Public Order and MassRepression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 2009).
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then granted them special access to goods and services in short supply.18These became the people with more to lose if the regime fell.The security agencies watched the mood of the masses, and thecommunist authorities learned not to push too hard. This restraintapplied first of all to the urban workers; in the 1930s, at moments whenlocal signals of discontent began to rise, Stalin was willing if necessary tohold resources back from his pet projects and distribute them to thetowns where they were needed to allay the threat of strikes ordemonstrations.19 He gave less consideration to the peasant farmers, andaccepted the deaths of millions from hunger in the famine of 1932/33that ended the first Soviet five-year plan (the same thing happened inChina in the much larger famine that ended Mao Zedong’s Great LeapForward).20Most Eastern European communists took somewhat more care, and inPoland and Yugoslavia they backtracked from early attempts atcollectivization rather than face down peasant resistance.21 But theloyalty of the general population remained at risk, and was always underpressure from both inside and outside. The inside factor was therelentless pressure from government goals for ‘socialist construction.’The outside factor was the appeal of personal freedom and consumersovereignty from the camp of the adversary.
Rise and fallThe great test of Stalin’s model of modernization came in World War II. Intwentieth century warfare the mass production of things such as guns,planes, and tanks and their delivery to the front line turned out to be adecisive factor. In World War II Soviet industry outproduced Germanyand enabled the Red Army to outfight the Wehrmacht. The Soviet rearremained stable, meaning that propensities to disloyalty were kept within
18 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union,
1921-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
19 Paul Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the
Soviet Secret Archives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76-109.
20 R. W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft, The Industrialisation of Soviet
Russia, vol. 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2003); Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the
Cultural Revolution, vol. 3: The Coming Cataclysm, 1961-1966 (New York:Columbia University Press, 1997).
21 Brus, ‘Institutional change’.
9
tolerable limits and food was delivered to the Red Army and the warfactories even when millions were starving to death.22The victory of 1945 projected the Soviet Union onto the world stage.In the late 1940s, the Soviet economic system became a model fordevelopment of the economies of the Soviet-dominated sphere in EasternEurope and then for China. But the years of undisputed Soviet hegemonywere brief. First Yugoslavia, then China and Albania, and later Romaniabroke away to follow their own preferred routes to modernity.All of these countries followed Stalin in benchmarking themselves onWestern productivity, Western living standards, and world market pricesand costs. How did Stalin’s goal ‘to catch up and overtake’ theeconomically more advanced countries hold up across the twentiethcentury? In 1931, when the capitalist world was mired in the GreatDepression, ‘to catch up and overtake’ may have seemed realistic. Stalinhad no idea that the era of the Great Depression would turn out to be themost technologically dynamic decade of American economic history.23While the military, industrial, and consumer technologies of the westprovided the target that the European communist regimes strained after,this target receded continuously over the rest of the century.Figures 1 and 2 summarize the bare facts of national economicdevelopment, measured by real national income per head undercommunist rule. National income is one way among many of measuringprogress. It tells us something about the potential of a society to producesocial welfare. National income does not tell us whether a society’spotential is efficiently utilized, how much has been diverted into militaryadventures or vanity projects, or how fairly the results are distributed.Thus, actual welfare and potential welfare may diverge. Still, we can befairly confident that people live better and longer when average incomesare $4,000 per head per year than when they are $400 – the bareminimum that, measured in the ‘international’ prices of 1990, AngusMaddison considered would just sustain human life over the 25-yearaverage span typical of traditional societies.24
22 John Barber and Mark Harrison, ‘Patriotic war, 1941 to 1945’, inRonald Grigor Suny, ed., The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, The
Twentieth Century, pp. 217-242 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006).
23 Alexander J. Field, A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S.
Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
24 E.g. Angus Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy:
The Roots of Modernity (Washington DC: AEI Press, 2005). On theempirical relationship between well-being and income across 141
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In figure 1 we see the growth and vicissitudes of the first socialisteconomy, that of the Soviet Union. In 1913 the Russian Empire waspoorest of the great powers. Average incomes were between three andfour times a subsistence minimum, and were similar to those prevailing inmuch of Eastern Europe. World War I was damaging, but a greatercatastrophe followed in the Russian Civil War, which reduced theeconomy to ruins and led to a devastating famine in 1921. After the warcame recovery. Under Stalin’s five year plans the Soviet economy wasstruck by further shocks. Some were self-inflicted: the collectivization ofagriculture, launched at the end of 1929, stripped the countryside of foodand led to another famine in which millions died. Stalin had a millionmore executed in the Great Terror of 1937 to 1938. This pattern wasrepeated 30 years later on a larger scale by China’s Great Leap Forwardand Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong. In the Soviet case,rearmament and World War II did further damage. During each of thesethings, the economy reeled but did not collapse; afterwards it recovered,and went on to record aggregate growth.After World War II the Soviet Union was joined by other states undercommunist rule. All of these economies were relatively poor, but therewere significant differences among them. Czechoslovakia was a relativelyprosperous middle income country, followed by East Germany, Hungary,Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania. Lagging far behindeven Albania, China was one of the poorest countries in the world with aneconomy barely above Maddison’s 400 dollar minimum.Figure 2 summarizes communist economic developments from 1950against the standards of the more advanced countries. It is useful todivide the postwar period into three phases. In the first phase, which ranfrom 1950 to 1973, the major regions under communism more thandoubled their average incomes. Both the Soviet Union and the EastEuropean countries on average somewhat caught up on the United States;the percentages are shown in Table 1. But the Western European marketeconomies were also growing rapidly so that the gap between Easternand Western Europe widened.A second phase began after 1973. Economic growth slowed downacross Europe, but, the deceleration was more pronounced in thecommunist economies, which began to fall behind America. The lagbehind Western Europe lengthened further. At the same time, in contrast,
countries and two decades, see Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, andJustin Wolfers, ‘Subjective well-being, income, economic development andgrowth’, NBER Working Paper no. 16441 (Cambridge, MA: NationalBureau of Economic Research, 2010).
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the Chinese economy accelerated and began to register relativeimprovement for the first time.This contrast became sharper still in the third phase, which beganaround 1990. The European countries threw off communist rule and wentthrough a period of deep economic depression. In China, communist partyrule remained intact and growth accelerated further. By 2008, thesecontrasting fortunes had led the three regions (China, the former SovietUnion, and Central and Eastern Europe) to a fairly similar level. At thesame time new gaps emerged, not visible in the figures shown, betweenthe richer countries of Central Europe and some parts of the formerSoviet Union; in 2008, for example, the citizens of Tadjikistan lived nobetter than Chinese people in the 1980s.Did communism accelerate economic development where it took root?It is not easy to isolate the influence of communism, because communismwas more likely to take hold in societies that were already poor anddamaged by warfare and civil conflict. The story of Western Europe after1945 was that initial conditions did not have a lasting effect. Countrieswith a lower starting point for average incomes, such as Greece, Italy,Portugal, and Spain, grew more quickly thereafter, and so movedgradually towards the level of the richer countries, and this was littleaffected by previous experience of war and civil conflict.In this context a simple test is informative. Using data for 16 WesternEuropean countries Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo show that each10-percentage-point shortfall in a country’s income level relative to theUnited States in 1950 added nearly one half of a percentage point to itsannual growth rate up to 1973. When they add data for 8 East Europeancountries, they find that relationship unchanged, but with the differencethat the underlying annual growth rate of East European incomes was 1.3percentage points lower than in Western Europe.25 In short, whencommunist economies grew faster than others, it was because they wereon average poorer and could exploit more opportunities to catch up.Despite this they grew slower on average than they should have, and thisis most likely because they were communist.In some places, the Cold War threw up ‘natural experiments’ wherethe iron curtain fell accidentally across previously integrated,ethnolinguistically homogeneous regions. Table 2 shows three examples:East and West Germany, Finland and Estonia, and North and South Korea.None of these pairs is perfectly controlled. Estonia and Finland were
25 Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, ‘Aggregate growth, 1950-2005,’in Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, eds, The Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Europe, vol. 2 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010), 303.
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distinct provinces of the Russian Empire before communism, with Estoniathe poorer of the two. Korea and Germany were previously unified; NorthKorea was somewhat richer than the South; East Germany was at a levelsimilar to the West. Then, these pairs had widely differing experiences ofwar and postwar occupation. But the evidence of Western Europe is thatthe economic consequences of World War II did not persist. In Korea theNorth lost its initial advantage under communist rule and eventually wentinto absolute decline. In Estonia and East Germany a lag emerged orpersisted and then deepened.These examples serve to confirm a systematic failure to catch up withthe West economically under communist rule. China’s comparativesuccess looks exceptional. With one fifth of the world’s population,however, China’s success has global significance and requires explanationbecause it has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.26
InstitutionsThe communist economies had important common features. Mostimportant was the politicization of economic life. A ruling communistparty gathered up the reins of state power in a one-party state. The statemonopolized the industrial and residential capital stocks, the channels ofbusiness and private communications and news and entertainmentmedia, the networks of transport, trade, and distribution, and health andeducational facilities. The ruling party’s monopoly of power wasinstitutionalized by three things. First, party structures were built inparallel with those of the state and the economy, and party cells becamethe eyes, ears, and mouthpieces of the party centre in every workshop,office, building site, and town hall. Second, the authority of higher levelsover those below was enforced behind the scenes by a vigilant internalsecurity agency. Third, economic decisions (in fact, all decisions of anyimportance and many of none) were made in secret and communicated tothe public, if at all, only after the event.In the economy, the state became the dominant purchaser of outputand allocated a large part of it towards government-approved (or‘planned’) projects of economic and military modernization. The rest itreleased to the retail market, where households could use their moneywages and other revenues to compete (or stand in line) for scarceconsumer goods and services. Usually the state also largely monopolizedagricultural land. Even where it did not, it controlled or supervisedagricultural markets and the disposition of the farmers’ food surpluses to
26 Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen, ‘China’s (uneven) progressagainst poverty’, Journal of Development Economics 82, no. 1 (2007), 1-42.
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the government and households. In addition the state eithermonopsonized labour or strictly controlled the workers’ ‘outside options’.Two institutions symbolized this above all: the near prohibition onemigration from each country, even to another friendly socialist country,and, within each country, the widespread use of forced labour to punishdisloyalty.Some of this is measurable, but imperfectly so. In Table 3, the first twocolumns report official estimates of the speed and extent to which theeconomy was ‘socialized’ in different countries after World War II. Thesocialization of agricultural land shows the extent to which land wastaken out of the hands of the existing peasant farmers and brought underthe management of state or ‘collective’ enterprises. These two weredistinguished mainly by the reward system for farmworkers – a wage (onstate farms) or a dividend of the residual income (on collective farms)after the state had taken its share. In most countries (including China, notshown in the table), land was rapidly brought under socialized controlafter the communist takeover, and socialization was fairly complete by1960. Poland and Yugoslavia were notable exceptions; there, the regimebacked off in the face of peasant resistance in the early 1950s.Differences in the extent of collectivization of agriculture did notprevent the state from monopolizing distribution. Even where farmingremained in private hands, most products passed through the hands ofthe state before reaching the final consumer. The third column of Table 2shows official estimates of the proportion of output in different countriesthat could be attributed to the ‘socialist’ sector in 1960. These rangedfrom just under two thirds in Poland to 100 per cent in the Soviet Unionand its loyal follower Bulgaria.Table 2 shows another side of the communist economic system: itspropensity to overstatement.27 All the figures for the socialization ofagricultural land are inflated by inclusion of the allotments that collectivefarms set aside for personal use by the farmers; income in kind from theseallotments helped to make up the farmers’ family subsistence, and off-farm sales also contributed a significant proportion of the food availableto urban consumers. In other words the table misleads by crediting thesocialist sector with both the land that was farmed privately and thecontribution of private farming to total output.Without exception, all the communist-ruled economies began byadopting a similar Stalinist mould of directive planning and resource
27S. G. Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies, ‘The crooked mirror of Sovieteconomic statistics’, in R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S. G. Wheatcroft,eds, The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 24-37.
14
mobilization. But the system of politicized decisions and bureaucraticallocations continually gave rise to dissatisfaction, which was felt just askeenly by officials and managers as by ordinary citizens.The root cause of this dissatisfaction was the interposition of thegovernment between producer and consumer. The government took uponitself to procure supplies from the state-owned (or peasant) producers atfixed prices and pass them on to the consumers. The consumers includedthe industrial and military users of industrial equipment and materials,employed by the state to work towards the objectives of the ruling party,as well as the privately motivated household consumers. The governmentset out to aggregate the expected needs of all the consumers, to distributethese needs among all the producers, and to issue contracts to them tomeet the sum of requirements. When the government fixed prices it alsodistributed consumer and producer surpluses (or deficits) accidentallyacross the economy and this created natural incentives to varyproduction and consumption which the government then had toneutralize or override in order to enforce the distribution that matchedits own preferences. To achieve this the government had to commit toconfiscate the profits and make up the losses of the plants and projects inthe economy, even though the government’s own agents, the managersand workers, contributed directly to these by managing and workingmore or less diligently.28 As a result, no factory was closed and no workerwas laid off because an activity was badly managed, and no producer feltthe compulsions that a competitive market provides to exert effort,economize on resources, and serve the final consumer efficiently.Not surprisingly, these arrangements suffered in any comparison withmarket economies, where consumers and producers find each othercompetitively, interact directly in a decentralized way, and bear the mainresponsibility for their own decisions. Various defects quickly becamewidespread. Producers served the quantitative imperatives of the plan,not the qualitative needs of the consumer. To work around the plan, theyengaged in ingenious simulations and frauds. To limit dependence onunreliable outsiders, ministers and managers encouraged the sourcing ofsupplies locally, or in-house, or on the farm; if the choice was make-versus-buy, ‘make’ beat ‘buy’ every time. Similar incentives inhibitedinternational trade, even among socialist economies. Never slow to makea virtue out of necessity, communist rulers such as North Korea’s Kim Il-sung worked out elaborate ideologies of self-reliance.
28 János Kornai, ‘The Hungarian reform process’, Journal of Economic
Literature 24, no. 4 (1986), 1697.
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These inefficiencies were costly. The costs were more manageablewhen the core task of socialist modernization was to copy and transplantexisting technologies for the mass production of standardized goods. Thecosts multiplied as mass production gave way to flexible systems(sometimes called mass customization), and became profound with theinformation revolution and the rise of the services-based economy. Therulers’ legitimacy suffered as the project of catching up and overtakingthe more advanced countries economically looked more and morehopeless.Substandard economic growth did not, however, prevent the SovietUnion from building strategic military parity with the United States.Calamitous economic decisions did not cause Stalin, Mao, Castro, or KimIl-sung to give up power. This lends support to the view that the revealedpreference of communist rulers was to place internal and externalsecurity above economic modernization.
ReformsIn the perspective of reform-minded communists, economic reforms wereintended to address two gaps. First was the gap between socialist andcapitalist achievements, which was visibly failing to close. Second was thegap between the actual achievements and true potential of the socialisteconomy, which was thought to be widening. Because the second gap wasintrinsically unknowable, it was generally measured by the first. Theresult was that, even though communist leaders after Stalin tended to behave a more technocratic outlook, and were more sceptical of the scopefor political mobilization, they continued to believe right up to the endthat, if only they could get the institutions right, they could bring about anew great leap forward in the economy.The mixed successes of Western European countries in catching upwith the United States as the global technological leader suggest that thenecessary institutional reforms should be thought of as a continuousprocess, not a one-off event. When a country is far from the technologicalfrontier, its growth is aided by institutions that implement technologiesdeveloped elsewhere. Large gains may be realized simply by movingworkers from the countryside to factories and towns. As the economymoves towards the frontier, however, the emphasis must shift graduallyaway from implementation to autonomous innovation, which can befostered by opening product markets to more stringent competition and
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raising the quality of education, for example.29 As the frontier recedes,and because successive general-purpose technologies impose differentinstitutional requirements, institutional adaptation must be continuous.In turn, this process continually disrupts established interests, throwingup the risk that at some point they may succeed in halting the process ofreform, causing economic growth to falter.30The core issue of socialist economic reform was the possibility ofnesting the advantages of decentralized markets within the structures ofsocialist state regulation.31 It was sometimes thought that centralizedplanning had worked well in the early years of so-called extensive growth,and needed reform only after industrial modernization. Public discussionof the need for reform waited for the death of Stalin and a new generationof more freethinking economists. The Russian archives have shown,however, that the need for reform became obvious to insiders when thefirst Soviet five-year plan was still under way. As early as 1931 Stalin’sindustry chief Sergo Ordzhonikidze had become a keen advocate ofdecentralizing intra-industry transactions to plant managers and lettingthem keep profits and bear losses.32 He was opposed from above andbelow. In the economy, industrial officials hoarded supplies andexaggerated demands; in other words, they continued to play thebureaucratic game, not the market game. In the Kremlin, Stalin andMolotov did not wish to give up detailed oversight of the allocation ofresources. At this time there was no reform.Because this did not solve any problems, the issue of reform remainedon the table in the postwar period. There were many variants but ashared theme was the need to replace physical controls on producers byfinancial controls, making producers responsible for profits and losses,
29 Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, ‘Appropriate growth theory: aunifying framework’, Journal of the European Economic Association 4, nos2-3 (2006), 269-314.
30 Nicholas Crafts and Marco Magnani, ‘The golden age and the secondglobalization in Italy’, in Gianni Toniolo, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the
Italian Economy, 1861-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,forthcoming).
31 Paul G. Hare, ‘Economic reform in eastern Europe’, Journal of
Economic Surveys 1, no. 1 (1987), 25-59.
32 R. W. Davies, The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia, vol. 4, Crisis andProgress in the Soviet Economy, 1931-1933 (Basingstoke: Macmillan,1996), 11-18, 201-28, 265-70, 345-6.
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increasing the influence of consumers, and so motivating the main actorsin the economy towards greater efficiency.Underlying reformist proposals was the idea of replacing the Stalinistmodel of the socialist economy, directed from the centre by a totalitariandictator, with a reform model that shared power more widely amongst alimited number of stakeholders, still within the overall framework of aone-party state. In the reform model the government would control theallocation of resources in very broad terms such as the overalldistribution of public spending and rate of growth of output, leaving roomfor other stakeholders, such as experts, managers, work teams andcollectives, and regional and municipal authorities, to negotiate the detailin alignment with their own aspirations and information. At the sametime the stakeholders would not be equal. The government would remainthe senior stakeholder. The communist party would still have the right toregulate all the stakeholders’ conduct and would retain the power, ifnecessary, to confiscate the junior stakes.The first such reform experiment, and one of the most durable, tookplace in Yugoslavia in 1948. A multi-ethnic state, Yugoslavia pioneerednational power-sharing among the federal republics, and marketsocialism without detailed planning from the centre. The basic unit of theYugoslav economy became the ‘self-managed’ firm under a party-guidedworkers’ council.Because Stalin rejected this innovation the immediate result was aschism within the communist camp, but after Stalin’s death othercountries began to move in the Yugoslav direction. In 1950s Poland andHungary, the main thrust of reform was towards power-sharing in thestate between political and expert councils, national and local interests,the representatives of industrial and social organizations, and so on. Suchdesigns commonly drew a link from power-sharing in the government topower sharing in the economy between workers and managers throughworkplace councils, with the socialist enterprise becoming the basic unitof non-government stakeholdings. Notably, power sharing on these lineswas often relabelled as ‘socialist democracy’. In Poland and Hungary theseideas were stamped out after the uprisings of 1956. The Czechoslovakreform movement of 1968 revived it briefly, but this too ended in Sovietmilitary intervention and repression.In other countries and periods a more top-down or technocraticconcept of stakeholding proved acceptable. Under Nikita Khrushchevbetween 1957 and 1965 the Soviet Union experimented with devolutionof some central planning functions to the regional level, but theexperiment was poorly designed, met with resistance, and was thenreversed. Other reforms implemented first in East Germany and thencopied in the Soviet Union put greater emphasis on new functions of the
18
socialist enterprise. Power sharing would extend to managers, but not toworkers’ councils, however guided by the party. One aim of enhancing theprerogatives of managers in relation to the workforce was to break up thepooling of risks and rewards within the enterprise, which discouragedinnovation and exceptional effort. Managers would be motivated to boostprofitability by sacking shirkers rather than to boost output by hiringadditional labour. Workers would be motivated to work harder and seekhigher incomes as productivity rose.While some aspects of socialist economic reform were clearlydesigned to mimic the discipline of a competitive market, the legacy of thetotalitarian model was unfavourable to this. One aspect of this legacy wasan industrial structure dominated by relatively small numbers of large,specialized state-owned enterprises that faced little competition and,even in the presence of competition, would have been ‘too big to fail’.Adding to this, socialist technocrats of the 1950s emphasized the failureof the socialist economy to produce diversified multi-divisionalcorporations with the large scale and scope to compete on world marketsagainst leading American and European firms. First Poland and EastGermany, and then the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Hungarysponsored the merger of state-owned multi-plant combines to fill thisgap.33 Reformers in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Hungary in the 1980srecognized that giant state-owned and politically connected corporationswould seriously undermine the competitive design of a decentralizedsocialist market economy.The country that went furthest towards admitting new stakeholdersinto the socialist economy was China. A first step was the emergence of‘regionally decentralized authoritarianism’ under Mao Zedong’s GreatLeap Forward.34 It coincided with – and formally resembled – the Sovietregional decentralization of 1957, but proved much more durable andeffective. Beyond political reasons, China’s 30 provinces, with averagepopulations of 20 million people at that time, were larger, morediversified, and more self-sufficient than the Soviet Union’s 150provinces, averaging little more than one million each. 35 In the first yearof the Great Leap Forward, Beijing handed more than half of its budget
33 Kornai, The Socialist System, 399-403.
34 Chenggang Xu, ‘The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms anddevelopment’, Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 4 (2011), 1076-1151.
35 Andrei Markevich and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, ‘M-form hierarchywith poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in SovietRussia’, Journal of Public Economics 95, 11–12 (2011), 1550-1560.
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revenues down to the provinces.36 While Mao remained the dictator, andthe communist party retained central control of local appointment,provincial officials were effectively set to compete against each other. Indue course regional decentralization helped to produce a capacity forinstitutional innovation, because provinces began to compete in tryingout innovative reforms.While Mao remained in charge there was little payoff in terms ofeconomic growth or modernization. Two decades of slow growth werepunctuated by setbacks caused by radical political mobilizations againstthose that Mao defined as China’s internal enemies. Following his death in1976, wider reforms were launched under the ‘four modernizations’ (ofagriculture, industry, science, and defence) with a transition fromcollective agriculture back to family farming under the ‘householdresponsibility system’. The reform process deepened in the 1980s withthe expansion of locally owned ‘township and village enterprises’ in the1980s, and in the 1990s with sweeping privatization of state-ownedindustry. While maintaining currency and capital controls, China alsobecame more integrated into global trade and financial markets than anyother communist-ruled country.This story suggests that, while still far from the world’s technologicalfrontier, China is the only communist-ruled country to have found aconsistent path of sustained reform and to have developed a capacity forinstitutional innovation. China’s success has been driven by its system of‘regionally decentralized authoritarianism’. When a similar system wastried in the Soviet Union, with more territorial fragmentation and lessfreedom to experiment, regional rivalry turned out to carry high costs andfew if any benefits. One might then ask why regional rivalry was not moreproductive across Eastern Europe at the national level, since each EastEuropean country had considerable freedom to experiment with nationaleconomic models and each national economy resembled a Chineseprovince in size and diversity more closely than a Soviet province. Amongthe reasons for European failure might be listed the greater job securityand tenure of each national leader, the greater forgiveness for pooreconomic performance compared with political deviation, and the factthat a more successful national economy could not attract labour orcapital across closed international borders.
36 Nicholas R. Lardy, ‘Economic planning in the People’s Republic ofChina: central-provincial fiscal relations’, in U.S. Congress, Joint EconomicCommittee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1975), 94-115.
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Other outcomesThe overall patterns arising from communist economic modernization inEurope can be summarized as follows. The economy was kept in a state ofpermanent mobilization, which meant that output and employment werepushed above the equilibrium level of a market economy. Participationrates for women in every age group were higher than in most marketeconomies, and this was particularly true of women past child bearingage.37 Continuous full employment was not an unmixed blessing,however, because there was no ‘creative destruction’ of loss makingactivities.Resources available for household consumption were squeezedbecause the communist-ruled economies typically saved between onequarter and one third of their national income each year – a much higherrate than in most market economies. They also allocated between onethird and one half of investment to building industrial facilities; again thisproportion was much higher than in most market economies. A muchsmaller proportion of industrial capacity was devoted to consumer goods,the rest being set aside for producing industrial materials, equipment, andarmaments.38When communist governments talked about ‘building socialism’ theyoften meant it literally. They put great emphasis and huge resources intocapital projects and infrastructure: new power stations, metallurgical andengineering factories, railways and canals, residential micro-regions,automotive technologies, and space satellites.39 Industrialization andurbanization were physically the same process; reflecting this legacy,industrial land today accounts for 32 and 44 per cent of the built up areasof Moscow and St Petersburg respectively, and around 25 per cent of
37 Kornai, The Socialist System, 207.
38 Kornai, The Socialist System, 166, 175; Ljubo Sirc, Economic
Devolution in Eastern Europe (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1969), 32.
39 J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London: Allen &Unwin, 1964); Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a
Civilization (Berkeley: University of. California Press, 1995). Scott W.Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern
Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lewis H.Siegelbaum, Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2007); Asif A. Siddiqi, The Red Rockets' Glare:
Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010); Mark. B. Smith, Property of Communists: The
Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev (DeKalb: NorthernIllinois University Press, 2010).
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large cities in Eastern Europe and China, compared with 4 to 10 per centfor big cities in market economies.40 These industrial cities symbolizedthe new socialist modernity. At the same time the productivity of theseinvestments was generally lower than might be expected of the sameresources in a market economy, and much was wasted in the form ofinfrastructure projects that were finished late or never, transport linksthat turned out not to be needed, and prestige ventures that contributedonly to the leaders’ vanity.41The communist-ruled economies were heavily militarized. The burdenof a large military establishment and extensive military industries on theeconomy was always hard to capture precisely, not least because it wassecret. The Soviet state budget for 1980 admitted to 17.1 billion rubles ofmilitary spending, or less than 4 per cent of the national material product;after the collapse of the Soviet state, the true figure was estimatedretrospectively at 48.9 billion rubles, or more than 10 per cent.Authoritative Western estimates gave figures that were twice that.42 Wenow know that the various channels of funding for the military budgethad been hidden from oversight for so long that even the budgetaryauthorities had no idea of the true figure.43Increases in production relied upon increases in capital and labourmore than on technological improvement or efficient reorganization.Production drew freely on the resources of natural environment. In 1985,for example, sulphur oxide emissions per head of the population jumpedby an order of magnitude as the observer crossed the line from capitalist
40 Alain Bertaud, ‘The spatial structures of Central and Eastern
European cities’, in Sasha Tsenkova and Zorica Nedović-Budić, eds, The
Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe, 91-110 (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2006); Alain Bertaud, ‘Urbanization in China: land use efficiencyissues’, Working Paper (2007) at alain-bertaud.com.
41 Kornai, The Socialist System, 167-168; William Easterly, and StanleyD. Fischer, ‘The Soviet economic decline’, World Bank Economic Review 9,no. 3 (1995), 341-371.
42 Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spending: a History
of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M UniversityPress, 1998); Iu. D. Masliukov and E. S. Glubokov, ‘Planirovanie ifinansirovanie voennoi promyshlennosti v SSSR’, in A. V. Minaev, ed.,
Sovetskaia voennaia moshch’ ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (Moscow: Voennyiparad, 1999), 82-129.
43 Mark Harrison, ‘Secrets, lies, and half truths: the decision to discloseSoviet defense outlays’, PERSA Working Paper no. 55 (2008), Universityof Warwick, Department of Economics, at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/persa.
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to communist Europe, although output per head was much lower on thecommunist side.44 Measures of environmental quality were censored andthe voice of concerned citizens was suppressed.Many people gained from socialist modernization. The governmentinvested heavily in science, technology, education, and health. It directlyemployed and promoted millions of people. Government officials,workers in important factories, residents of important towns, and theirfamilies generally had privileged access to goods and services. Thisincluded notionally public services such as higher education and high-quality health care. The communist states tended to have a good record ofextending basic facilities to ordinary citizens although here too statisticsoverstate the case. Cuba, which is poor and socialist, reports a rate ofmortality of infants under one year similar to that of the United States,which is rich and capitalist.45 In fact, American hospitals have moreinclusive definitions of live birth, bring more problematic pregnancies to alive birth, and so would outperform Cuba on properly standardizedperformance measures.46Outside the circle of privilege, consumers had to stand in line. Lossesarising from waiting time and forced substitution substantiallydiminished the real worth of goods nominally available.47 At differenttimes almost anything could be in short supply, from housing andautomobiles to sausages and sanitary towels. In the 1980s the housingwaiting list varied from 3-4 years in East Germany to 15-30 years inPoland; that for a Lada automobile varied from 3-4 years inCzechoslovakia to 10-12 years in Bulgaria.48 For many ordinary citizens ofthe Soviet bloc, to have access to the personal freedom and privacy ofmotor car travel became a litmus test of socialist modernization. Afamily’s acquisition of an automobile was a landmark event, but with itcame new anxieties about finding fuel and parts: ‘In Russia they say that
44 Kornai, The Socialist System, 179.
45 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, WorldPopulation Prospects, at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp.
46 Scott Atlas, In Excellent Health: Setting the Record Straight onAmerica's Health Care (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2012).
47, Irwin L. Collier, ‘The “Welfare Standard” and Soviet Consumers’,
Comparative Economic Studies 47, no. 2 (2003), 333-45.
48 Kornai, The Socialist System, 234
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owning a car brings joy twice in an owner’s life – when it is bought andwhen it is sold. In between there is only torture.’49Communism in the European style appeared to offer the dream ofmodernized consumption, but without consumer sovereignty. In practice,consumers were continually threatened with relapse into rationing andthe ‘crisis mode of consumption’ of communism’s darkest years.50
The China DealWith the important exception of China, the experience of reformcommunism was unsuccessful. The starting point was dissatisfaction withthe results of the Stalinist command economy, in which both the partyand the people gradually lost confidence. Officially sanctioned reformswere supposed to be the solution. In practice, power sharing and thedelegation of authority to managers had both intended and unintendedconsequences. They were intended to put more pressure on managersand workers to exert effort, but this often led to unrest whichimmediately switched the traffic lights to red. Other unintendedconsequences included unpredictable changes in the pattern of demandand the distribution of income, which also led to dissatisfaction. Except inChina, where the leaders managed the discontent and persisted withreforms, ruling parties tended to grab power back from other potentialstakeholders and reverse the reforms, to the detriment of their owncredibility. 51 The result was a progressive loss of faith in the capacity ofthe government to innovate solutions, which came on top of the originalloss of faith in the traditional model.A by-product was increased toleration of sideline economic activity,including the resort to unofficial markets to reallocate state products inways not prescribed in government plans. The American economist James
49 Cited by Siegelbaum, Cars for Comrades, 243-4.
50 Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art ofSurvival in Stalin’s Russia, 1927-1941 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001);Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, RetailPractices, and Consumption, 1917-1953 (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2004).
51 Vladimir Kontorovich, ‘Lessons of the 1965 Soviet economicreform’, Soviet Studies 40, no. 2 (1988), 308-316; Gertrude E. Schroeder,‘The Soviet economy on a treadmill of “reforms”’, in U.S. Congress, JointEconomic Committee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, vol. 1(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 312-340; MarkHarrison, ‘Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet commandeconomy’, Economic History Review 55 no. 3 (2002), 397-433.
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R. Millar called this the ‘Little Deal’, after the original ‘Big Deal’, VeraDunham’s term for Stalin’s pact with the new Soviet labour aristocracy.52Under the Big Deal, Soviet workers that worked hard, gained experience,and upgraded their skills were promised the rudiments of a middle classlifestyle. The Little Deal was Brezhnev’s pact with workers and managersto permit private trading and the private use of state-owned facilities onthe side as long as it was discreet and did not interfere with majorimportant government priorities.The sideline economy was a double-edged instrument. 53 The activitiesof thieves and private traders helped households to secure thecommodities they desired. Trading on the side could help factories obtainthe materials and supplies necessary to fulfil their plans. But officials andmanagers were corrupted, and work discipline, public morality, and thelegitimacy of state property were undermined.In short, the failure of the communist states of Eastern Europe to catchup and overtake the West is easily explained. Their polities were closedand authoritarian. Their economies were overcentralized andunreformable. Corruption got out of hand. In the endgame, insiderinterests ‘stole the state’.54In contrast, China has grown rapidly over three decades, significantlyclosing the gap with more advanced countries and levering hundreds ofmillions of people out of poverty. The state has not been pulled apart, andthe government has not had to backtrack on reform. Yet the Chinese stateremains authoritarian, secretive, and corrupt. Economic life is stillpoliticized. The essential ingredients of a decentralized market economy –separation of the economy from politics, clear property rights, free andenforceable contracts, and the rule of law – are still missing.How has China done squared the circle? After the death of Mao,China’s leaders felt their way, by accident as much as by design, to a newdeal within the party and society. More radical than Stalin’s Big Deal,more ambitious than Brezhnev’s Little Deal, the China Deal transformedthe sideline economy into a legitimate (but not law-governed) private
52 James R. Millar, ‘The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s contribution toacquisitive socialism’, Slavic Review 44, no. 4 (1985), 694-706.
53 Gregory Grossman, ‘Notes on the illegal private economy andcorruption’, in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in
a Time of Change, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government PrintingOffice (1979), 834-855.
54 Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet
Institutions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, I998).
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sector, integrated into the system of regionally decentralizedauthoritarianism.The deal was made first of all with the provincial leaders; these weregiven new ways to contend with each other for advancement bypromoting competing regional models of economic enterprise, alwaysprovided these did not challenge party rule. Then, China’s entrepreneurswere offered the chance to accumulate personal wealth by competingwith each other to serve the consumer directly in regional markets. 55 Butthe right to enter the market was restricted to those whose absoluteloyalty was assured by political connections. Without some externaldiscipline, restricted access would create large rents and threaten todestabilize the distribution of income. One source of discipline was thecompetition among regional models, which forced China’s new elite toaccumulate rather than consume. In Chenggang Xu’s opinion, withoutfierce rivalry among provincial leaders the Chinese government andeconomy would collapse.56 The other source of discipline was the worldmarket, where Chinese firms were also made to compete.Finally, the China Deal embraced the poor. Hundreds of millions ofpeople would be allowed to migrate to successful regions and to rise outof abject poverty, provided this did not lead to pressure for mass politicalrights.The China Deal radically extended the stakeholder concept of acommunist society. New stakes were granted in unprecedented number;at the same time, the government retained the senior stake bymaintaining a large public sector and withholding secure private propertyrights. Competition among entrepreneurs harnessed the private sector tothe objectives of national economic modernization. Rivalry amongprovincial leaders broke resistance to continuous policy reform. Thus,China’s modernization has proceeded without universal market freedoms,third-party enforced property rights, or the subjection of the rulers to therule of law.In 2005 for the first time China’s private sector exceeded the statesector by value of output. China’s private sector has proved consistentlymore innovative than its state-owned enterprises and (except in the case
55 Yasheng Huang summed up the resulting combination of competingregional models and strong regional border effects as ‘one country, thirty-one economies’, in Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the
Reform Era (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.141.
56 Xu, ‘Fundamental institutions’, 1141.
26
of state monopolies) more profitable.57 Private firms have made higherprofits despite the fact that state-owned enterprises have benefited fromnearly exclusive access to bank credit and a valuable credit subsidyarising from implicit government guarantees. The profit gap implies,however, that China still has too much productive capital locked up in thestate sector. Moreover, there is a question mark over whether China’sprivate firms can continue to exploit the opportunities of the informationrevolution, given oppressive and corrupt regulation, the relatively smallsize of most private firms, and shortfalls in China’s human capital.58China’s experience with political modernization suggestscircumstances in which the ruling party’s desire for ‘stability of the rear’might hinder continued policy reform. In 1989, faced with the overthrowof communism in Eastern Europe, the Chinese communist partydecisively rejected the so-called ‘fifth’ modernization, democracy. China’srulers remain above the law. As Xu has pointed out, in China ‘regions haveno inherent power, and regional power is granted by the centralauthorities’.59 Whatever has been granted can be confiscated. The samecan be said of the personal rights of all China’s junior stakeholders,including private proprietors.Can China’s modernization continue beyond the ‘middle income trap’?By the 1970s most countries of Latin America and the Middle East hadrisen from low to middle income status, as China has now done, but nonewent on to join the club of high income countries.60 As we have discussed,movement towards the global frontier requires policy reform to continue,and this must continually infringe on established economic and politicalinterests. The chance that at some point defensive coalitions will form inChina that have the power to block further change, and thus halt theprocess of catching up, remains high.
57 The World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and
Creative High-Income Society (Washington, DC: The World Bank andDevelopment Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republicof China, 2012), 111.
58 China’s issues today have parallels with Italy’s in the recent past; onthe latter see Crafts and Magnani, ‘The golden age’.
59 Xu, ‘Fundamental institutions’, 1087.
60 The World Bank, China 2030, 12.
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Figures
Figure 1. Real national income per head, Russia and USSR, from 1885 to
2008
Source: Andrei Markevich and Mark Harrison, ‘Great War, Civil War, andRecovery: Russia’s National Income, 1913 to 1928’, Journal of Economic






























Figure 2. Real national income per head: selected countries and regions
from 1950 to 2008, at 1990 prices and international dollars
Source: Data by Angus Maddison at www.ggdc.net/maddison.Notes: All figures are measured in international dollars and 1990 prices.The two vertical lines are drawn at 1974 and 1990. With a logarithmicvertical axis, per cent gaps are proportional to vertical distance and percent growth rates are proportional to slopes. The West European 12 areAustria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Central andEastern Europe 7 are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,Romania, and Yugoslavia. The ‘communist average’ covers the formerSoviet Union, China, the CEE-7, and North Korea from 1950 to 1989.
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Tables
Table 1. ‘Overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically’: real
national income per head of selected communist countries and regions in
selected years, per cent of market-economy countries and regions1950-54 1970-74 1983-87 2003-07Soviet Union, per cent of:USA 28.8 36.6 33.1 ...Western European 12 57.1 51.7 46.3 ...Central and EasternEuropean 7, per cent of:USA 22.0 30.1 28.7 ...Western European 12 43.5 42.5 40.2 ...China, per cent of:USA 5.1 5.1 7.3 18.4Western European 12 10.0 7.2 10.2 26.7Source: Data by Angus Maddison at www.ggdc.net/maddison.Notes: Figures given are five-year averages. All figures are measured ininternational dollars and 1990 prices. The West European 12 are Austria,Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Central and EasternEurope 7 are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,Romania, and Yugoslavia.
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Table 2. Three regions divided by the Cold War: real national income per
head, selected years 1936 1950 1973 1990 2008West Germany 4,570 4,280 13,147 18,691 …East Germany 4,781 2,796 7,695 5,101 …Per cent of West 105% 65% 59% 27% …Finland 3,729 4,253 11,085 16,866 24,344Estonia* … … 8,657 10,820 19,951Per cent of Finland … … 78% 64% 82%South Korea 1,437 854 2,824 8,704 19,614North Korea** … 854 2,824 2,841 1,122Per cent of South … 100% 100% 33% 6%Sources: Data by Angus Maddison at www.ggdc.net/maddison, exceptGermany, East and West, within 1990 frontiers from Angus Maddison, The
World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD), p. 178.Notes: All figures are measured in international dollars and 1990 prices.* Angus Maddison, The World Economy, pp. 208-209, noted that ‘In1940 North Korean GDP per capita was nearly 50 per cent higher than inthe South …so it seems reasonable to suppose that 1950 North Koreanper capita GDP was at least as high … I have assumed that per capita GDPwas the same in the North as in the South from 1950 to 1973, with noprogress to 1991. Thereafter, North Korea stopped receiving Soviet aid,and its per capita income has fallen a great deal.’** Timo Myllyntaus, ‘Standard of living in Estonia and Finland in the1930s’, in Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, Humanities and
Social Sciences 41, no.3 (1992), pp. 184-191, compared nominal wages,food prices, and the diffusion of consumer durables in Finland andEstonia between the wars. Without endorsing any particular figure, heconcluded that ‘at the end of the interwar period, the level of real earningsper capita was higher in Finland than in Estonia. The difference was thennot so huge as it is nowadays [circa 1990], but presumably it was so greatthat contemporaries could not avoid noticing it.’
31
Table 3. Degrees of socialization: selected countries, 1953 and 1960, and per
cent Per cent ofagricultural land Per cent of nationalincome produced1953 1960 1960Soviet Union 94 97 100Bulgaria 56 91 100Czechoslovakia 54 87 99Hungary 39 77 91Albania 13 85 88East Germany 5 90 85Romania 21 84 83Yugoslavia 37 10 73Poland 19 13 63Sources: Brus, ‘Institutional change’, 9, 80, 83, except USSR from TsSUSSSR, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik(Gosstatizdat: Moscow, 1960), 82, and Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. 1922-1972. Iubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Statistika: Moscow, 1972),240. China is not shown but, according to Carl Riskin, China’s PoliticalEconomy: The Quest for Development since 1949 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1987), 86, at the end of 1953, 39 per cent of Chinesepeasant households were enlisted in mutual aid teams, and 99 per cent inrural people’s communes by the end of 1958.
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